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ARTICLES
A CERTIFICATION RULE FOR CALIFORNIA
Jerome I. Braun*
I. INTRODUCTION
At least forty states have a procedure which allows a fed-
eral court, uncertain about a point of state law that could de-
termine the outcome of a case before it, to certify that ques-
tion to the state's highest court and receive an authoritative
answer. This relieves the federal court of the need to specu-
late about state law, and protects the state from having its
law misinterpreted or misapplied in a potentially influential
federal decision.'
However, certification requires an enabling procedure
permitting the state court to receive and answer the certified
question.2 Many states have adopted the Uniform Certifica-
tion of Questions of Law Act,3 and other states have estab-
lished certification procedures by statute or by rule. Califor-
nia alone among the states in the Ninth Circuit has no such
procedure.4 Federal courts considering questions of Califor-
* Jerome I. Braun is a founding partner of the San Francisco law firm of
Farella, Braun & Martel. He acknowledges the assistance of David F. Phillips,
also of Farella, Braun & Martel, in preparing this article.
1. "Certification assures that federal courts are apprised of the substan-
tive norms of the [state] legal system." Bonner v. Oklahoma Rock Corp., 863
P.2d 1176, 1178 n.3 (Okla. 1993).
2. See, e.g., Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. McKay, 769 F.2d 534, 541
n.12 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting certification unavailable where Nevada had no en-
abling mechanism). Nevada has since adopted such a mechanism by rule. See
NEV. R. App. P. 5.
3. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT, 12 U.L.A. 49 (1975).
4. See ALASKA R. App. P. 407; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1861 (1994);
HAw. REV. STAT. § 602-5(2) (1993); Aw. R. App. P. 13; IDAHO App. R. 12.1; NEV.
R. App. P. 5; OR. REV. STAT.§ 28.200 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2.60.010-.030 (West 1988); Irion v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 461 P.2d 199 (Mont.
1969) (Montana Supreme Court stating that it had the authority to answer cer-
tified questions).
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nia law are therefore unable to certify them to the California
Supreme Court.
This lack of a certification procedure is a regrettable gap
in California law. This article proposes a draft rule [hereinaf-
ter "Proposed Rule"] establishing a California certification
procedure, with commentaries on its particular provisions
and on certain other aspects of the proposal. The Proposed
Rule, in substantially the same form, was presented to the
California State-Federal Judicial Council on April 7, 1994,
was endorsed by the Ninth Circuit Senior Advisory Board,
and has since been submitted informally to justices of the
California Supreme Court. In October of 1995, the Confer-
ence of Delegates of the State Bar of California recommended
that the Supreme Court "adopt a draft rule," and that the
legislature adopt a constitutional amendment, permitting a
certification procedure, and that the California Supreme
Court also adopt another "draft rule" in substantially the
same language as the Proposed Rule presented here.5 These
events, although no doubt helpful, do not appear yet to have
brought adoption of a certification procedure appreciably
closer. Accordingly, this article is intended to bring a broader
understanding of the virtues of the Proposed Rule to the Cali-
fornia bench and bar, and perhaps generate sufficient sup-
port to bring the proposal nearer to fruition.
After a discussion of the desirability and constitutional-
ity of a certification provision and possible methods of adop-
tion, this article presents the full text of the Proposed Rule
and a detailed commentary on each of its provisions. The
Proposed Rule has several especially distinctive features, in-
cluding: (1) a limitation restricting the power of certification
to the United States Supreme Court and United States
Courts of Appeals [section 1]; (2) a requirement that the certi-
fying court include an analysis showing that the question cer-
tified is truly contested, has no controlling precedent in state
law, and is potentially determinative of the cause [section
3(d)]; (3) a list of factors for the state supreme court to con-
sider in exercising its absolute discretion to accept or reject a
certified question [section 6]; (4) a provision permitting the
5. The version recommended by the Conference of Delegates differed from
the original proposal in that it would have extended the power of certification to
"any" federal court, including district courts, and would have withheld from the
California Supreme Court the power to restate a certified question.
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state supreme court to restate the question [section 7]; and
(5) a provision permitting intervention by the state attorney
general at the court's invitation if the validity of a state stat-
ute is called into doubt [section 9].6
II. THE DESIRABILITY OF THE PROPOSED RULE
A. Advantages of Certification
When a court has to determine the law of another juris-
diction on a given point, and the law in that jurisdiction is
unclear on that point, the court is obliged to speculate about
what the highest court of the other jurisdiction would decide.
As Judge Friendly of the Second Circuit put it: "Our princi-
pal task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to determine
what the New York courts would think the California courts
would think on an issue about which neither has thought."7
Especially since the Erie decision,8 federal courts have
had frequent occasion to determine state law, and they have
not always been right. For example, in the classic case of
Green v. American Tobacco Co.,9 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a
products liability judgment for a tobacco company, against a
plaintiff with lung cancer, on the basis that Florida law re-
quired knowledge of the defect or condition for a defendant to
be held liable on an implied warranty."° When one judge on
the panel dissented, the court granted rehearing to permit
certification of this question to the Florida Supreme Court.
The Florida court replied that Florida law was otherwise.11
Judge Rives began his second opinion by saying:
First, to the Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida
we wish to express publicly and with deep sincerity our
appreciation for their answer to the question which we
certified to that Court. That answer has saved this Court,
through the writer as its organ, from committing a serious
error as to the law of Florida which might have resulted in
6. See discussion infra part V.
7. Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1960), set
aside by 365 U.S. 293, 296 (1961).
8. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
9. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), certifying question to 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla.),
and conformed to answer, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
943 (1964).
10. Green, 304 F.2d at 73.
11. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla.), conformed to an-
swer, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964).
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a grave miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court of
Florida has been a very real help in the administration of
justice. 12
DeWeerth v. Baldinger13 is a particularly poignant case.
DeWeerth owned a painting by Monet that was stolen in Ger-
many at the close of World War II.' 4 When DeWeerth
learned of its whereabouts many years later, she sued for its
return.15 The federal district court in New York held the ac-
tion timely and ordered the painting returned. 16 But, the
Second Circuit reversed, imposing a diligence requirement it
believed existed under state law. 17 The circuit court refused
to certify the diligence question to New York's high court, on
the ground that "that valuable procedure should be confined
to issues likely to recur with some frequency."1 8 Four years
later, in Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell,'9 on
nearly identical facts, New York's highest court decided the
diligence question exactly the opposite way, noting that "the
issue has recurred several times in the three years since
DeWeerth was decided."20 DeWeerth then went back to the
federal district court and asked the same judge who had orig-
inally ordered the painting returned to grant her relief from
the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60.21
The judge granted relief on the ground that federalism con-
fided this issue to state law and DeWeerth should not be pe-
nalized for bringing a meritorious action in a federal court
which misconstrued it, rather than in a state court which
would have held correctly. 22 But, the Second Circuit reversed
again, holding that their earlier decision, although wrong,
12. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673, 674 (5th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964) (citations omitted).
13. 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), rev'g 658 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988).
14. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 105.
15. Id. at 105-06.
16. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F. Supp. 688, 695 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 836
F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988).
17. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 108, 112.
18. Id. at 108 n.5.
19. 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
20. Id. at 429.
21. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 804 F. Supp. 539, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd, 38
F.3d 1266 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 512 (1994).
22. Id. at 550.
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had at least the virtue of finality.23 And so, even though her
action had been timely all along, DeWeerth never got her Mo-
net back because an available certification procedure was not
used.24
Many similar examples exist.25 For instance, a study by
the Federal Judicial Center2 6 describes the case of a district
judge who decided, with a memorandum opinion, a case turn-
ing on a question of state law. The study quotes the judge as
follows:
Then, I discovered a district judge was permitted to
certify a question, vacated my order, obtained the neces-
sary forms from the [state s]upreme [c]ourt..., and sent
the question to that tribunal. After full briefing and oral
argument, the... [slupreme [clourt decided the question.
As you might have suspected, the ... court's resolution of
the issue was opposite to mine. Thus, had there been no
certification procedure, the only case in the books upon
which counsel and parties might rely for the interpreta-
tion of that provision of... law would have been a district
court opinion from [another] district by a district judge
who had never practiced in the ... district courts nor sat
as a judge in that state. Presumably, when the issue fi-
nally reached the ... courts, that state's supreme court
would have resolved it contrary to the district judge's res-
olution and the parties that had relied upon that federal
court interpretation in the meantime would have acted
contrary to law.2 7
Thus, from a federal court's point of view, allowing certi-
fication of an uncertain point of state law avoids both the ne-
cessity of time-consuming speculation on the unfamiliar law
of a foreign jurisdiction and the possibility of embarrassing
23. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1275 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 512 (1994).
24. I am grateful to Simon J. Frankel, Esq., of San Francisco, for bringing
the DeWeerth cases to my attention.
25. Compare Haynes v. James H. Carr, Inc., 427 F.2d 700, 704 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970) with Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., 180
S.E.2d 664, 667 (Va. 1971). See also cases cited in Scott v. Bank One Trust Co.,
577 N.E.2d 1077, 1080 (Ohio 1991); John A. Scanelli, Comment, The Case for
Certification, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627, 642 nn.93-97 (1971).
26. CARROLL SERON, CERTIFYING QUESTION OF STATE LAW: EXPERIENCE OF
FEDERAL JUDGES (1983).
27. Id. at 13-14 (deleting the name of the state to preserve the judge's
anonymity).
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error.28 By certifying a question of state statutory interpreta-
tion, a federal court can also sometimes avoid deciding a con-
stitutional issue without abstaining.29
From a state court's point of view, certification is an im-
portant instrument in preventing confusion about the state's
law due to incorrect federal court determinations.3 0  It
strengthens the primacy of the state supreme court in inter-
preting state law by giving it the first opportunity to rule on
an undecided or unclear issue (certification is only used when
state law on a given issue is unclear or nonexistent). Al-
lowing federal courts to defer to state courts in such cases
reinforces the federal judiciary's acknowledgment of state
sovereignty and fosters values of federalism and comity in a
way beneficial to state interests.3 1 In Scott v. Bank One Trust
28. See, e.g., Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1994). "Certifi-
cation has proved to be an important tool for federal courts sitting in diversity,
since it frees them from having to speculate how state courts will decide impor-
tant questions of state law." Id. at 719.
Indeed, once an answer is received the federal court is obliged to follow it as
law of the case. A federal court that certifies a question of state law should not
be free to treat the answer as merely advisory unless the state court specifically
contemplates that result. Cf Sifers v. General Marine Catering Co., 892 F.2d
386, 391 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding parties are bound by an answer to a certified
question because it is the law of the case). When a state supreme court accepts
a certified question, it voluntarily undertakes a substantial burden and its reso-
lution of the issue must not be disregarded. Id. Accord Longway v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Supervisors, 24 F.3d 397, 401 (2d Cir. 1994). If a state refuses a
certified question, the federal court has no choice but to make an "Erie guess."
See Naquin v. Prudential Assurance Co., 71 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 1995). And, if
emergency action is required during the pendency of the certification, for exam-
ple where injunctive relief is requested, the federal court may act on its provi-
sional interpretation of the law. See A Woman's Choice - East Side Medical
Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434, 1442 n.2, 1468, 1474 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
29. Cf Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383 (1988); Bellotti
v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976). Note, however, that certification is improper if a
statute is not reasonably susceptible to a narrowing construction to save its
constitutionality. "A federal court may not properly ask a state court if it would
care in effect to rewrite a statute." City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 471
(1987). This principle has been applied quite frequently. See, e.g., Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 930 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 64
U.S.L.W. 3635 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1996) (No. 95-974); Planned Parenthood, Sioux
Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1463 (8th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed,
64 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1995) (No. 95-856).
30. The same considerations apply to determinations of state law by the
courts of other states, for example in conflict of laws cases.
31. See, e.g., Geib v. Amoco Oil Co., 29 F.3d 1050, 1060-61 (6th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Co-
operative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 344, 350 (1963)) (certification
CERTIFICATION RULE
Co.,32 the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the state certification
procedure and stated that:
[t]he state's sovereignty is unquestionably implicated
when federal courts construe state law. If the federal
court errs, it applies law other than Ohio law, in deroga-
tion of the state's right to prescribe a rule of decision. By
allocating rights and duties incorrectly, the federal court
both does an injustice to one or more parties, and frus-
trates the state's policy that would have allocated the
rights and duties differently. The frustration of the
state's policy may have a more lasting effect, because
other potential litigants are likely to behave as if the fed-
eral decision were the law of the state. In that way, the
federal court has, at least temporarily, made state law of
which the state would have disapproved, had its courts
had the first opportunity to pass on the question.
• . . Points of state law that seem unclear to federal
courts may be quite clear to [iunformed local courts, which
may find meaning not discernible to the outsider....
* . . [W]e strongly believe in the importance of accu-
rately applying Ohio law in federal courts.
33
Certification can also avoid conflicts between state and
federal courts, and "does in the long run save time, energy
and resources and helps build a cooperative federalism.
Certification can also forestall needless litigation. "By
providing a procedure by which the state court can interpret
a statute before the federal court considers the statute's con-
stitutionality, certification permits states and federal courts
to collaborate in the wise endeavor to avoid constitutional ad-
judications unless they are indispensable for resolving the
controversy."
3 5
This is especially true in the area of Pullman absten-
tion.36 In Pullman cases, a federal court abstains from decid-
ing a case where a state law is challenged on federal constitu-
prevents invasion of state law making function and avoids needless federal-
state friction).
32. 577 N.E.2d 1077 (Ohio 1991).
33. Scott, 577 N.E.2d at 1080 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
34. Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974). See also, e.g.,
Shirley v. Russell, 69 F.3d 839, 844 (7th Cir. 1995).
35. M. Frankel, Federal Certification of State Law Questions, 1 FED. LrrmG.
GUIDE REP. 511, 513 (1987).
36. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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tional grounds if a court determination of an unsettled point
of state law could dispose of the matter and make a constitu-
tional decision unnecessary.37 Permitting certification in
such cases short-circuits the process and makes state litiga-
tion unnecessary, with a consequential saving of state trial
and appellate court resources. 8 Settling an important but
unclear point of state law can also independently reduce state
litigation and prevent or resolve conflicts among state courts.
It is worth noting that as long ago as 1983, a committee
of the American Bar Association urged
each state to adopt a procedure whereby the highest court
of the state may answer a question of state law certified
by an Article III court of the United States, when the an-
swer will be controlling in an action in the certifying court
and cannot in the opinion of the certifying court be satis-
factorily determined in light of state authorities.3 9
B. Fear of Inundation
One constraint on adoption of certification procedures
has been the fear of inundation. The concern is that if other
jurisdictions are permitted to refer questions of state law to
the state supreme court, they will do so unreasonably often as
a way of delegating or evading their own responsibilities. As
a result, the state supreme court will spend an inordinate
amount of time answering questions of concern to people liti-
gating elsewhere, at the expense of its own litigants.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, this [concern] appears to
have little weight. In the nearly half-century history of
the interjurisdictional-certification process, only a hand-
ful of questions have been certified .... None of the forty
jurisdictions with certification procedures has reported
37. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., 17 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION § 4242 (2d ed. Supp. 1987). For a good example of this doctrine in
practice, see Virginia Soc'y for Human Life v. Caldwell, 906 F. Supp. 1071, 1074
(W.D. Va. 1995).
38. There are savings at the trial and intermediate appellate stages be-
cause a new state action is avoided entirely. Although the certified question
will require a state supreme court adjudication, this requires fewer resources
than appellate review of an entire state action because only one point need be
determined.
39. SPECIAL COMM. ON COORDINATION OF FED. JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS, AM.
BAR ASS'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Feb. 1983).
942 [Vol. 36
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being overburdened by the number of certified questions,
despite the prevalent fear of inundation.4 °
The number of questions certified has always been quite
small. For example, during 1990 and 1991, certified ques-
tions comprised only about one-third of one percent of the to-
tal filings in state supreme courts in the Ninth Circuit.41
Many factors operate to make inundation very unlikely.
First, questions are not certified unless state law is unclear.42
Second, questions are not certified (and certainly should not
be accepted) unless the answer might determine the outcome
of the case.43 Section 3(d) of the Proposed Rule requires
statements by the certifying court on both these points.44
Third, United States courts have historically been quite
conservative in matters of certification, and have been
scrupulous to limit their use of this procedure even beyond
what state procedures require. As one circuit judge wrote,
"we use much judgment, restraint and discretion in certify-
ing. We do not abdicate."45 For example, in Woodbridge
Place Apartments v. Washington Square Capital, Inc.,46 the
40. Ira P. Robbins, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act: A
Proposal for Reform, 18 J. LEGIS. 127, 137 (1992). For citations to the laws of
the forty jurisdictions, updated to 1992, see id. at 185-86.
41. See infra Appendix I.
42. See Snow v. Harnischfeger Corp., 12 F.3d 1154, 1161 (1st Cir. 1993)
(refusing certification because sufficient guidance available in state decisions),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 56 (1994); Koffski v. Village of North Barrington, 988
F.2d 41, 45 n.8 (7th Cir. 1993); cf Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Duro Bag Mfg. Co.,
50 F.3d 370, 372 (6th Cir. 1995) (concluding that "well-established principles" of
state law were sufficient even without case governing exact point); Swearingen
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 968 F.2d 559, 564 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
that a state statute was sufficiently clear even without state decisional inter-
pretation). Especially notable is Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 735 F.2d 1165,
1167-68 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985), where the Ninth
Circuit refused certification on the ground that state law was not unsettled,
even though the state supreme court had just granted reconsideration of a re-
cent decision involving the disputed rule.
43. See, e.g., In re McLinn, 744 F.2d 677, 681-82 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied
sub nom. Churchill v. FV Fjord, 497 U.S. 1025 (1990) (refusing certification
where unresolved factual issue could be dispositive); Boyter v. Commissioner,
668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981) (refusing certification where undecided federal
issue could be dispositive); see also Retail Software Servs., Inc. v. Lashlee, 525
N.E.2d 737 (N.Y. 1988) (refusing to address the question as it did not satisfy
state constitutional requirement that it "may be determinative of the cause").
44. See infra part V.3.d.
45. Barnes v. Atlantic & Pac. Life Ins. Co., 514 F.2d 704, 705 n.4 (5th Cir.),
certifying question to 325 So. 2d 143 (Ala. 1975), and conformed to answer, 530
F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1976).
46. 965 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1992).
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Seventh Circuit refused to certify a question on the ground
that "fact specific, particularized decisions that lack broad
general significance are not suitable for certification. "4 7
Moreover, in Mount Vernon Fire Insurance Co. v. Creative
Housing, Ltd.,48 the court noted that the probable frequent
recurrence of the disputed point and its implication of "impor-
tant values" in the evolution of state law "weigh in favor" of
certifying a question.4 9 In McLinn, the Ninth Circuit stated
that "particularly compelling reasons must be shown when
certification is requested for the first time on appeal by a mo-
vant who lost on the issue below."50 In Fischer v. Bar Harbor
Banking & Trust Co., 5 1 the First Circuit denied certification
to a plaintiff who could have sued in state court, but instead
elected a federal forum on the ground of diversity.52 The fed-
eral case law contains many other examples of such self-
restraint.53
47. Woodbridge Place Apartments, 965 F.2d at 1434.
48. 70 F.3d 720 (2d Cir. 1995).
49. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 70 F.3d at 723.
50. In re McLinn, 744 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom.
Churchill v. F/V Fjord, 497 U.S. 1025 (1990). In McLinn, the Ninth Circuit also
quoted with approval the Fifth Circuit's requirement that a certified question
must be close, and the issue must be important to the state in terms of comity.
Id. (quoting Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 275 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Florida, 425 U.S. 930 and cert. denied
sub nom. Standard Oil Co. v. Florida, 429 U.S. 829 (1976)).
51. 857 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1018 (1989).
52. Fischer, 857 F.2d at 8. "[O]ne who chooses the federal courts in diver-
sity actions is in a peculiarly poor position to seek certification. We do not look
favorably, either on trying to take two bites at the cherry by applying to the
state court after failing to persuade the federal court, or on duplicating judicial
effort." Id. (quoting Cantwell v. University of Mass., 551 F.2d 879, 880 (1st Cir.
1977)). See also National Bank of Wash. v. Pearson, 863 F.2d 322, 327 (4th Cir.
1988) (holding that certification was inappropriate on motion of one who had
removed case from state court after losing on issue before state judge. "If Pear-
son had wanted the Maryland Court of Appeals to rule on the matter, he should
not have removed the action to federal court.").
53. For a thoughtful list of criteria to be considered by federal courts in
deciding whether to certify a question, see Rowson v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus.,
866 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Iowa 1994).
A court may consider the following factors in determining whether
to certify a question to the state supreme court: (1) the extent to which
the legal issue under consideration has been left unsettled by the state
courts; (2) the availability of legal resources which would aid the court
in coming to a conclusion on the legal issue; (3) the court's familiarity
with the pertinent state law; (4) the time demands on the court's
docket and the docket of the state supreme court; (5) the frequency
that the legal issue in question is likely to recur; and (6) the age of the
CERTIFICATION RULE
Fourth, under the Proposed Rule, the California
Supreme Court would have absolute discretion to accept or
decline certification.54 Section 6 of the Proposed Rule lists
many criteria for accepting or declining a question, but there
is no obligation to accept a question under any circumstances.
Should the court receive more certified questions suitable for
answer than anticipated, it need accept only those it wishes
to answer and can answer conveniently. The California
Supreme Court has not hesitated to use its discretionary
power over appellate review as an instrument of docket con-
trol, and there is no reason to expect that it would do other-
wise with certified questions.
Finally, the Proposed Rule would limit certification to
United States Courts of Appeals and the United States
Supreme Court. It would thereby eliminate most of the likely
certifying jurisdictions, the district courts.
III. METHODS OF ADOPTION
There are three methods by which California could adopt
a certification procedure: by rule, by statute, and by popular
vote.
A. By Rule
The best method would be for the supreme court (or the
Judicial Council) to adopt a procedure by rule. This would be
by far the fastest route, and would reserve maximum control
over the specifics of the procedure to the judicial branch. As
discussed below, it seems clear that the California Supreme
Court, like most others that have considered the matter, has
the constitutional authority to adopt a certification procedure
by rule.55 For these reasons, the Proposed Rule has been cast
as a Supreme Court Rule.
B. By Statute
In the alternative, the state legislature could establish a
certification procedure by statute. However, passing a stat-
ute would be time consuming, would remove the fashioning of
current litigation and the possible prejudice to the litigants which may
result from certification.
Id. at 1225.
54. See infra part V.
55. See infra part IV.
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the provisions from the court's control, and would expose the
adoption process to external influences. The statutory ap-
proach is also clearly constitutional.56
If the statutory method is used, it would be best to par-
ticipate in the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law
Act.57 Uniform state laws are good things in themselves and
it would be beneficial to further that effort. Also, California
would be able to benefit directly from the experience and in-
terpretation of other jurisdictions. Other solutions are of
course possible, and some states (such as New York) have
passed their own statutes without explicit reference to the
Uniform Act. Most of the states that have adopted the Uni-
form Act have made some variation in it. Although the Pro-
posed Rule is based in large part on the text of the Uniform
Act, the most useful features of each state's peculiar varia-
tions have been assimilated into it.
C. By Popular Vote
The Proposed Rule could also be adopted by the people at
an election through initiative or referendum, either as a stat-
ute or as a constitutional amendment. This method is the
least attractive alternative. It would take the longest time,
and would be the most expensive and most politicized method
of adoption. The initiative would require a yes or no vote
without opportunity for amendment. The popular vote would
also subject a technical and specialized legal procedure to the
determination of the voters at large, who have neither the in-
terest nor the qualifications to make an appropriately rea-
soned and considered judgment. Adopting a certification pro-
cedure by constitutional amendment would certainly remove
any question about its constitutionality, but no such question
is sufficiently substantial to require such a cumbersome
method of adoption.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSED RULE
This section examines the constitutionality of certifica-
tion procedures. As California has no such procedure, there
is no domestic law on the question, and accordingly, frequent
reference is made to the constitutional decisions of other
56. See infra part IV.
57. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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states. Appendix II contains the full text of the relevant con-
stitutional provisions in California and selected other states,
with constitutional analysis from the supreme courts of the
states concerned.58
A. Advisory Opinions
The Proposed Rule has been carefully drafted to guaran-
tee: (1) that the court will only address issues presented on a
fully developed factual record; (2) that the court will only ad-
dress issues that are truly contested between the parties; (3)
that the answer will be dispositive of the issue; (4) that set-
tling the issue may determine the outcome of the entire ac-
tion; and (5) that the answer will be res judicata between the
parties. Most state courts that have considered the issue
have held these provisions sufficient to prevent an answer to
a certified question from being an advisory opinion.59
B. Constitutionality of Adoption by Supreme Court Rule
There is no doubt that answering certified questions is
an exercise of the judicial function.6 ° It can therefore be done
only by the judiciary, as the entire judicial power is vested in
the supreme court and the inferior courts.61 Because certifi-
cation requires a definitive statement by the highest state
court, the California Supreme Court is the only judicial organ
suitable for (or capable of) answering certified questions.
58. See infra Appendix II.
59. See, e.g., Schlieter v. Carlos, 775 P.2d 709, 710 (N.M. 1989); In re Elliott,
446 P.2d 347, 354-355 (Wash. 1968); cf In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 832 (Me.
1966) (certification by federal court becomes, by the force of the certification
statute itself, "the jurisdictional vehicle for placing the matter before the court
for its action"); Western Helicopter Servs., Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 811
P.2d 627, 633 (Or. 1991).
60. See, e.g., Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Comm., 109 P.2d
935, 939 (Cal. 1941) (ultimate interpretation of statute is an exercise of judicial
power); People v. Bird, 300 P. 23, 26 (Cal. 1931) (judicial function is to declare
the law and define the rights of the parties under it); Quinchard v. Board of
Trustees, 45 P. 856 (Cal. 1896) (determination of rights of individual under ex-
isting laws is exercise of judicial power). A number of hoary definitions of the
judicial power are usefully collected in Matin Water & Power Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 154 P. 864, 866-67 (Cal. 1916).
61. CAL. CONST. art VI, § 1. See also Strumsky v. San Diego County Em-
ployees Retirement Ass'n, 520 P.2d 29, 39 (Cal. 1974) (stating that Article VI
disposes of all judicial power not expressly disposed of elsewhere in the state
constitution, leaving the entire judicial power concentrated in the state court
system and constitutional agencies).
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Ohio adopted certification by Supreme Court Rule, and
the question arose whether such a rule was constitutional.
The Ohio Supreme Court resolved the constitutional issue as
follows:
In our view, [the] power [to decide certified questions] ex-
ists by virtue of Ohio's very existence as a state in our
federal system. We begin with a truism: the Ohio Consti-
tution permits the state to exercise its own sovereignty as
far as the United States Constitution and laws permit.
Since federal law recognizes Ohio's sovereignty by making
Ohio law applicable in federal courts, the state has the
power to exercise and the responsibility to protect that
sovereignty. Therefore, if answering certified questions
serves to further the state's interests and preserve the
state's sovereignty, the appropriate branch of state gov-
ernment - this court - may constitutionally answer
them.62
It seems clear that when a federal court misinterprets
California law, in a decision lying beyond California Supreme
Court review, it complicates the work of the California judici-
ary. As a Texas Supreme Court justice stated:
We encourage federal courts to inquire concerning the res-
olution of doubtful questions of state law which are criti-
cal to the outcome of pending litigation. Certainly we
have a strong preference for this approach rather than the
alternative - an incorrect federal surmise regarding how
we would resolve a matter of disputed Texas law. Such
federal errors would only serve to make our work more
difficult by leading to misreliance on federal precedents by
both the bench and bar.63
The California Supreme Court, like all other state
supreme courts, has inherent power (absent a constitutional
restriction) to aid and protect the exercise of its judicial
power.
By providing for certification, California would preserve
its sovereignty, reinforce the primacy of the supreme court in
interpreting California law, protect California law from mis-
interpretation, reduce demands on state judicial resources,
and improve the administration of justice. It is accordingly
62. Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1079-80 (Ohio 1991).
63. Amberboy v. Socit de Banque Priv~e, 831 S.W.2d 793, 799 (Tex.) (Dog-
gett, J., concurring in part and dissenting), conformed to answer sub nom. Ack-
erman v. F.D.I.C., 973 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1992).
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within the province of a state supreme court to provide for
certification by court rule. Of the forty jurisdictions that have
adopted certification procedures, at least nine have proceeded
by court rule alone without an enabling statute or constitu-
tional amendment.6 4 Where the power of the state supreme
court to adopt a certification rule has been challenged and
litigated, the court's power has usually been upheld. It
seemed sufficiently obvious to the Montana Supreme Court
that it had the power to answer a certified question, even in
the absence of a statute, that it asserted this power summa-
rily.65 And the Washington Supreme Court, considering this
question in In re Elliott,66 noted that:
So patent is the power of a court to render an opinion in
response to a certified question that New Hampshire has
adopted the practice by court rule, not waiting for an ex-
pression of legislative approval of the idea. Supreme
Court Rule 21... is treated by the New Hampshire court
as a rule of procedure, that court obviously finding no con-
stitutional impediment to the adoption of such a rule.
This court, under its rule-making power... could do
as the Supreme Court of New Hampshire has done. It
could also accept a certified question and respond to it
even if there were no implementing statute or rule. It is
within the inherent power of the court as the judicial body
authorized by the constitution to render decisions respect-
ing the law of this state.6 7
The Idaho Supreme Court followed the Washington pre-
cedent in Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance
Co.,68 holding that it had the power to entertain certified
questions "by exercise of its judicial power."69 The Idaho
court held explicitly that certification was within its inherent
64. The jurisdictions are Colorado, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Rhode Island and Puerto Rico. See Rob-
bins, supra note 40, at 160 n.270.
65. See Irion v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 461 P.2d 199, 202-03 (Mont. 1969).
66. 446 P.2d 347 (Wash. 1968).
67. In re Elliott, 446 P.2d at 358. Cf Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.
2d 735, 742 (Fla. 1961) (holding that absent a constitutional provision to the
contrary, a state may adopt a certification procedure "by statute if it is deemed
to be a substantive matter, or by a rule of this court if it is deemed to be a
matter of 'practice and procedure' ").
68. 666 P.2d 1144 (Idaho 1983).
69. Sunshine Mining Co, 666 P.2d at 1147 (citing In re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347
(Wash. 1968) and Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 742 (Fla. 1961)).
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power to make the judicial power effective in the administra-
tion of justice.7 °
The Ohio Supreme Court also did not hesitate to uphold
Ohio's adoption of certification by rule.
To the extent that a federal court applies different legal
rules than the state court would have, the state's sover-
eignty is diminished;... the federal court has made state
law. From the state's viewpoint, losing part of its sover-
eignty is no small matter, especially since a federal court's
error may perpetuate itself in state courts until the state's
highest court corrects it.
Certification ensures that federal courts will properly
apply state law. It thus strengthens the "federalist struc-
ture of joint sovereigns," and redeems "the promise of lib-
erty" contained in the federal and Ohio Constitutions. We
cannot doubt our power to protect Ohio's sovereignty from
inadvertent encroachments by federal courts. We there-
fore hold that Rule XVI is constitutional.7 '
The only reported case holding it unconstitutional to
adopt a certification procedure is Holden v. N.L. Industries,
Inc.72 Significantly, this case turned on specific exclusionary
language in the Utah constitution to the effect that the Utah
Supreme Court had original jurisdiction to issue five named
writs, and "[i]n other cases the Supreme Court shall have ap-
pellate jurisdiction only ....", The Utah court held that this
word prevented the supreme court from exercising jurisdic-
tion over certified questions.7 4
The comparable provision in most state constitutions
omits the word only. In the absence of that negative, the
constitutional conferral of appellate jurisdiction would be
susceptible to the construction that the court's jurisdiction
could be enlarged by an exercise of legislative or judicial
70. Id. at 1147-48.
71. Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1079-81 (Ohio 1991) (ci-
tations omitted).
72. 629 P.2d 428, 432 (Utah 1981). Missouri has also held, in a series of
unreported memoranda, that the jurisdiction provided for it under its state cer-
tification statute was beyond that constitutionally permitted. See, e.g., Grant-
ham v. Missouri Dep't of Corrections, No. 72576, 1990 WL 602159 (Mo. July 13,
1990).
73. Holden, 629 P.2d at 430 (quoting UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (amended
1984)) (emphasis added).
74. Since Holden, the Utah Constitution has been amended to permit the
supreme court to accept certified questions. See UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 3;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2 (Mitchie Supp. 1995); UTAH R. APP. P. 41.
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power.... Such was the case in In re Elliott... where the
Washington Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of a statute providing for certification.
75
The absence of any such restriction in the California Consti-
tution strongly suggests that the power of the California
Supreme Court is not inhibited in this regard.7 6
C. Constitutionality of Adoption by Judicial Council
Article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution per-
mits the Judicial Council, in order to "improve the adminis-
tration of justice," to adopt rules of practice and procedure
not inconsistent with statute.7 7 This appears to be sufficient
independent constitutional authority for the Council to adopt
a certification rule.78
D. Constitutionality of Adoption by Statute
In Methodist Hospital v. Saylor,7 9 the California
Supreme Court set out the constitutional position as follows:
Unlike the federal Constitution, which is a grant of power
to Congress, the California Constitution is a limitation or
restriction on the powers of the Legislature. Two impor-
tant consequences flow from this fact. First, the entire
law-making authority of the state, except the people's
right of initiative and referendum, is vested in the Legis-
lature, and that body may exercise any and all legislative
powers which are not expressly or by necessary implica-
tion denied to it by the Constitution. In other words, "we
75. Holden, 629 P.2d at 430 (emphasis added). The Court went on to say:
The procedure devised to permit federal courts to certify questions of
state law for state courts to answer is a commendable effort to further
the interest of justice through cooperative efforts by state and federal
courts. If our constitutional powers permitted us to be involved in that
kind of cooperative effort.., we would have no hesitancy.
Id. at 431.
76. Cf. In re Garner, 177 P. 162 (Cal. 1918). The California Supreme Court
stated that "[iun the absence of a [statutory] provision. . . , or where it is inade-
quate, no doubt but such a constitutional court by virtue of its inherent power,
may itself prescribe appropriate provision for acquiring jurisdiction and adopt
the procedure to be followed." Id. at 164 (emphasis added). Garner concerned
the contempt power, but there is no reason to think the same principles do not
apply to a fundamental judicial power such as stating the law. See id.
77. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
78. Cf, e.g., Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 742 (Fla. 1961)
(holding that the state supreme court could adopt a certification procedure by
rule "if it is deemed to be a matter of 'practice and procedure' ").
79. 488 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1971).
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do not look to the Constitution to determine whether the
Legislature is authorized to do an act, but only to see if it
is prohibited."
Secondly, all intendments favor the exercise of the
legislature's plenary authority: "If there is any doubt as
to the Legislature's power to act in any given case, the
doubt should be resolved in favor of the Legislature's ac-
tion. Such restrictions and limitations [imposed by the
Constitution] are to be construed strictly, and are not to
be extended to include matters not covered by the lan-
guage used."8 °
Under this reasoning, since the California Constitution
does not prohibit establishing a certification procedure, the
legislature may do so as long as the scheme it adopts keeps
the actual decision of certified cases in the judicial branch.
There would indeed be serious constitutional problems if
the legislature were to adopt a system under which it or the
executive branch, or any agency was designated to decide cer-
tified questions. Accepting and deciding certified questions is
an exercise of the judicial power,8 1 and the entire judicial
power is vested in the supreme court and inferior courts.8 2
No such difficulty arises under the present proposal, as ac-
ceptance and decision are kept entirely under the control of
the supreme court.
It is true that the power to accept and decide certified
questions is not explicitly mentioned in Article 6 of the consti-
tution. Furthermore, there is language in Tex-Cal Land
Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board8 3
and in Younger v. Superior Court 4 which appears at first
glance to assume an enumerative view of the supreme court's
constitutional jurisdiction. Closer study reveals, however,
that these cases do not contradict the constitutional frame-
work set out in Methodist Hospital v. Saylor. 5
Rather, they stand for the proposition that the legisla-
ture cannot expand the jurisdiction of the courts beyond what
is permitted by the constitution. But, a legislatively enacted
80. Methodist Hosp., 488 P.2d at 164-65 (citations omitted).
81. See supra note 59.
82. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 1. See also Strumsky v. San Diego City Employ-
ees Retirement Ass'n, 520 P.2d 29 (Cal. 1974).
83. 595 P.2d 579, 586 (Cal. 1979).
84. 577 P.2d 1014, 1025 (Cal. 1978) (citing People ex rel. Lynch v. Superior
Court, 464 P.2d 126 (Cal. 1970)).
85. 488 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1971).
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certification procedure would not expand the judicial power
at all. As the case law holds, 6 the judicial power already in-
cludes the authority to declare the law of the state.8 7 A stat-
ute would only create a structure for the supreme court to ex-
ercise this pre-existing power. 8 And, the prevailing
constitutional jurisprudence holds that provisions enumerat-
ing the jurisdiction of a state supreme court does not affect
the court's inherent power to accept certified questions.89
E. Amendment of the Government Code
A useful short cut might be for the legislature to add a
clause to California Government Code section 68070(a), so
that it would read as follows (proposed language appears in
italic):
(a) Every court may make rules for its own government
and the government of its officers not inconsistent with
law or the rules adopted and prescribed by the Judicial
Council, and the Supreme Court shall [may] make rules
for the decision of questions of state law certified by other
judicial authorities.90
That would provide explicit legislative authority for the
supreme court to adopt a certification rule without having the
rule itself drafted by the legislature.
V. TEXT OF THE PROPOSED RULE
[PROPOSED] RULE GOVERNING ACCEPTANCE OF QUESTIONS OF
STATE LAW CERTIFIED BY FEDERAL APPELLATE
COURTS
1. The California Supreme Court may answer questions
of law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United
States or by a United States Court of Appeals, provided that:
a. such answer is requested by the certifying court;
86. See supra note 59.
87. Also, Younger, 577 P.2d at 1014, concerned advisory opinions. The Pro-
posed Rule was carefully drafted to avoid the risk that a decision of a certified
question could be considered an advisory opinion. See supra part IV.A.
88. As long ago as 1875, the California Supreme Court held that "the mere
procedure by which jurisdiction is to be exercised may be prescribed by the leg-
islature, unless, indeed, such regulations should be found to substantially im-
pair the constitutional powers of the courts, or practically defeat their exercise."
Ex parte Harker, 49 Cal. 465, 467 (1875).
89. See infra Appendix II.
90. CAL. GOVT CODE § 68070(a) (West Supp. 1996).
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b. the proceeding before the certifying court in-
volves a question or questions of California law which
may be determinative of the cause then pending
therein; and
c. it appears to the certifying court that there is no
controlling precedent concerning the certified ques-
tion in the decisions of the California appellate
courts.
2. This Rule may be invoked only by an order of a court
referred to in section 1.
3. A certification order shall set forth:
a. the style of the case, including names and ad-
dresses of counsel and parties appearing pro se;
b. the question[s] of law to be answered;
c. a statement (by stipulation of the parties subject
to approval by the certifying court, or by the court it-
self if no such stipulation can be obtained) of all facts
relevant to the certified question, and showing fully
the nature of the controversy and the circumstances
in which the question arose;
d. an analysis by the certifying court showing that
the question certified is truly contested and that
there is no controlling precedent in California case
law, and stating how an authoritative answer to the
certified question might be determinative of the
cause; and
e. such additional material as the certifying court
may deem relevant and useful.
4. Exhibits, excerpts from the record, a summary of the
facts found by the trial court, and other documents may be
furnished by the certifying court to the California Supreme
Court along with the certification order, if in the opinion of
the certifying court they may be helpful in providing an ade-
quate understanding of the controversy. Such additional ma-
terial may be furnished at the request of the California
Supreme Court if in the opinion of the Court additional mate-
rial may be necessary or useful in answering the certified
question. The California Supreme Court may require the
original or copies of all or any portion of the record before the




5. The certification order shall be prepared by the certi-
fying court, signed by the judge presiding at the certification
hearing (if any) or by the presiding judge of the court or panel
certifying the question, and forwarded to the California
Supreme Court by the clerk of the certifying court under its
official seal.
6. It shall be within the sole and absolute discretion of
the California Supreme Court whether to accept certification
or answer a certified question. In exercising its discretion the
Court may consider any factors, including without limitation:
a. the existence of precedent in the California
Supreme Court or in the California Courts of Appeal;
b. the degree of uncertainty in the law;
c. the importance of the question certified;
d. whether answering the question will facilitate
the functioning of the certifying federal court;
e. whether answering the question will facilitate
termination of existing litigation;
f. considerations of comity with regard to the re-
quest of the certifying court;
g. the procedural posture of the case;
h. the extent to which a decision would turn on
questions of fact;
i. the extent to which an answer would be disposi-
tive of the cause;
j. matters ordinarily considered in deciding whether
to grant review of a decision of a California Court of
Appeal; and
k. any other factors the Court may deem appropri-
ate in the circumstances of the case.
7. It shall be within the discretion of the California
Supreme Court to restate the certified question as it deems
appropriate. Any such answer shall be limited to questions of
California law.
8. Notice of the California Supreme Court's decision
whether to answer the question will be given by its Clerk to
the certifying court. Thereafter:
a. proceedings in the California Supreme Court on
any certified question shall by as provided in the Cal-
ifornia Rules of Court and the California Supreme
Court's Rules for briefing, argument, and conduct of
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civil appeals, unless otherwise provided by the Court
or by the Judicial Council;
b. fees and costs shall be the same as in civil ap-
peals docketed before the California Supreme Court
and shall be equally divided between the parties un-
less otherwise ordered by the certifying court in its
certification order, or by the California Supreme
Court;
c. if certification was initiated by a party to the fed-
eral cause, that party shall be the petitioner on the
certified question; but if certification was initiated
upon the federal court's own motion, the appellant in
the federal cause shall be the petitioner on the certi-
fied question unless the certifying court shall specify
otherwise in its order; and
d. the California Supreme Court may in its discre-
tion assign a certified question such priority on its
docket as considerations of fairness, exigency and
comity may require.
9. If the certified question calls into doubt the constitu-
tionality of any California statute, the Court may in its dis-
cretion notify the California Attorney General and permit
him or her to intervene.
10. The written opinion of the California Supreme
Court stating the law governing the certified question shall
be sent by the clerk to the certifying court, and to the parties,
under the seal of the Supreme Court.
11. The California Supreme Court may in its discretion
refer a certified question to an intermediate appellate court
or other referee for a preliminary or advisory determination,
but only the California Supreme Court may answer a certi-
fied question. In case of any such reference the California
Supreme Court shall review the response of such court or ref-
eree; upon such review the California Supreme Court shall
either adopt (or modify) the determination of the intermedi-
ate court or referee by its own opinion or order, or substitute
its own determination of the question. An order of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court adopting or modifying a determination
of an intermediate court or referee shall include the text of
any such determination, and shall constitute the written




12. The California Supreme Court's answer to a certi-
fied question shall have the same authority and precedential
force as any other decision of the Court, and shall be pub-
lished in the Official Reports. It shall be res judicata as to the
parties to the cause.
13. The Judicial Council may adopt procedures gov-
erning practice under this Rule.
VI. COMMENTARY ON THE PROPOSED RULE
The Proposed Rule, like the certification procedure in al-
most every state, whether adopted by statute or rule, is based
on the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act.91 The
operative statute or rule in nearly every state with a certifica-
tion procedure has been consulted, and variations from sev-
eral states have been adapted where they appeared to make
the procedure better suited to California concerns.
A. Section 1
1. United States Courts
Many states' versions permit certification not only from
the United States Supreme Court and United States Courts
of Appeals, but also from United States District Courts and
other specialized federal courts. This Proposed Rule, similar
to those in eight other states, excludes district courts.92
Permitting district courts to certify questions would fur-
ther California's objective of preventing incorrect determina-
tions of state law. By reducing the need for Pullman absten-
tion, it would also cause a slight consequent reduction on the
state trial court caseload. On the other hand, confining certi-
fication to the appellate level would assure that certified
questions will have a fully developed factual record, and
would reduce the absolute number of certified questions.
It appears that many jurisdictions which exclude district
courts from certification have done so because they feared an
avalanche of certified questions. The literature indicates that
certification has been used very sparingly, and that there has
been no avalanche even in those states which permit district
91. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT, 12 U.L.A. 49 (1975).
92. The states are Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, New York and Wisconsin. See Robbins, supra note 40, at 162 n.289.
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court certification.93 Although allowing district court certifi-
cations seems preferable as a matter of public policy, the Pro-
posed Rule excludes them in deference to concerns expressed
informally by members of the supreme court. When, how-
ever, the State Bar Conference of Delegates modified this
Proposed Rule prior to recommending its adoption in October
1995, they broadened the scope of certification authority to
include "any federal court."94 Beyond accommodating the
concerns of some justices then sitting, there is no principled
reason to prefer their position to the bar's more expansive
view. Because certification would be so helpful a device at
the district court level, even if the more restrictive approach
were taken at first, the exclusion of district courts might use-
fully be revisited after the procedure had been in operation
for a time.
2. State Courts
A number of jurisdictions follow the Uniform Act by per-
mitting certification to and from the highest (and sometimes
intermediate) appellate courts of other states. This proce-
dure would be a very useful device in conflict of laws cases. It
appears from the literature, however, that interstate certifi-
cation has never been used in any reported case in the entire
history of certification procedures. 95 There seems, therefore,
to be little practical loss in excluding interstate certification
from the Proposed Rule. Thus, this type of certification is ex-
cluded both in the interest of simplicity and to reassure those
who fear an inundation of certified questions. Proposals for
reform of the Uniform Act have focused on the potential util-
ity of interstate certification, however, and this issue could
also be revisited at some appropriate future time.
3. Determinative of the Cause
This formulation is the method usually applied. It is nec-
essary in order to avoid the possibility that an answer might
otherwise be an advisory opinion or that the case might not
present a true controversy. The intention of this Proposed
Rule is that the certified question will be determinative of at
least one issue in the case and may therefore determine the
93. See discussion supra part II.B.
94. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
95. Robbins, supra note 40, at 136.
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outcome. Requiring that the question will definitely be dis-
positive of the entire cause would be so restrictive as to
render the whole procedure useless. In Western Helicopter
Services, Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp. ,96 the court explicitly
rejected the narrower view and required only that an answer
"have the potential to determine at least one claim in the
case."
97
The discretion of the certifying court, and the require-
ment in section 3(d) that the certifying court state "how an
authoritative answer to the certified question might be deter-
minative of the cause," should ordinarily prove sufficient to
avoid certification of questions which would not be determi-
native of an important and perhaps pivotal issue in a case.
Should such a question be certified anyway, the California
Supreme Court could appropriately decline to answer it.
The proposed standard permits the supreme court, if it
decides to answer the question, to focus on the substantive
issue without needless involvement in procedural matters
and abstract predictions about the eventual outcome of the
federal case.
4. Controlling Precedent
Some states (e.g., Alabama and Indiana) limit certifica-
tion to situations where there is no controlling precedent in
the state supreme court, thereby excluding cases controlled
by precedent in intermediate appellate courts. This Proposed
Rule permits certification if there is no controlling precedent
in the "California appellate courts." This conforms to the fed-
eral rule, which requires that where state law provides the
rule of decision, and there is no controlling decision in the
state supreme court, federal courts are obliged to follow the
decisions of intermediate state courts in the absence of con-
vincing evidence that the state supreme court would decide
the question differently.98 If there were no supreme court
precedent, but an intermediate precedent appeared to control
the case, the supreme court could decline to answer or note in
96. 811 P.2d 627 (Or. 1991).
97. Western Helicopter Servs., Inc., 811 P.2d at 630 & n.4.
98. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 178-79 (1940); Stoner v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464, 467 (1940). See, e.g., In re Kirkland, 915
F.2d 1236, 1238-39 (9th Cir. 1990). For an example of this principle applied in
the certification context, see Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 418 (5th Cir.
1986).
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its memorandum that no answer was necessary in view of the
intermediate court decision. Alternatively, if it felt the lower
court decision was incorrect, the court could as a discretion-
ary matter accept the question in order to overrule the
decision.
If there were no supreme court precedent, and intermedi-
ate decisions conflicted, certification would be permitted
under this Proposed Rule because neither intermediate deci-
sion could be said to be "controlling" in the presence of the
other. In such a case, the supreme court might wish to accept
certification because accepting the question would not only
clarify California law, but would also avoid requiring the fed-
eral court to choose between two conflicting intermediate
court holdings and possibly embed an incorrect choice. This
is a classic example of the utility of the certification
procedure.
Some states require that there be no "clear" controlling
precedent. The Proposed Rule omits this additional word as
surplusage, and because it has the potential for involving the
supreme court in unnecessary and distracting determina-
tions of whether controlling precedent is "clear" or not.
B. Section 2: Invocation
This section makes it clear that the parties to a federal
case cannot invoke certification without an order of the certi-
fying court. Some states' versions appear to permit a certifi-
cation rule to be invoked by a party to the federal court ac-
tion, or limit it to the court's own motion. This Proposed Rule
requires the court of appeal to decide for itself whether to is-
sue the order, regardless of whose idea it originally was,
without suggesting that a party to a federal cause has a right
to invoke certification on its own motion.
99
99. The Ninth Circuit has made it clear that, while a party may move to
certify a question, the decision to certify must lie within the discretion of the
federal court. In re McLinn, 744 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub
nom. Churchill v. F/V Fjord, 497 U.S. 1025 (1990). For a good example of a
court of appeals certifying a question on its own motion, see Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm'n, 40 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding
that, where parties bypassed state procedure which would have permitted the
state court to decide state law issue of first impression, certification was appro-
priate to promote federal-state comity), certifying question to 659 N.E.2d 710
(Mass. 1996). See also Nuccio v. Nuccio, 62 F.3d 14, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1995) (certi-




1. Contents of Certification Order
This section combines features of various state proce-
dures, with some new clarifying language.
2. Statement of Facts
This provision assures that any question certified will be
decided in a clearly expressed factual context. This would
simplify the work of the supreme court by requiring that the
parties and the certifying court provide a ready-made and
conveniently stated factual matrix; rather than requiring the
supreme court to deduce the facts from a possibly lengthy rec-
ord. 100 It also helps guarantee that the answer will not be an
abstract legal statement or an advisory opinion, but will be
grounded in the facts of an actual controversy.
3. Analysis by the Court
Like the statement of facts, this requirement helps as-
sure that the answer will be dispositive of a contested issue
possibly determinative of the cause, and is therefore not an
advisory opinion.
D. Section 4: Record and Exhibits
This combines provisions from various states' versions of
certification rules, and it is designed to assure the supreme
court access to as much of the record as it may require.
100. See, e.g., Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 796 F. Supp.
117, 119 (D. Del. 1992) (refusing to certify a question because the comprehen-
sive statement of facts required under the Connecticut certification statute
could not be obtained). See also Ortega v. IBP, Inc., 874 P.2d 1188 (Kan. 1994)
(stating that facts not in certification may not be added by litigants in receiving
court and evidentiary rulings of certifying court are not in issue on certified
question), conformed to answer, No. CIV.A.92-2351-KHV, 1994 WL 373888 (D.
Kan. June 27, 1994), and conformed to answer, No. CIV.A.92-2351-KHV, 1994
WL 373887 (D. Kan. July 1, 1994); City of Las Cruces v. El Paso Elec. Co., 904
F. Supp. 1238, 1256-57 (D.N.M. 1995) (reserving ruling on a requested certifica-
tion until an evidentiary hearing resolved disputed factual questions), reconsid-
eration denied, No. CIV.2:95-485 LCS, CIV.2:95-385 LCS/JH, 1996 WL 33125,
(D.N.M. Jan. 4, 1996).
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E. Section 5: Transmission of Certification Order
This section, adapted from the Uniform Act, recites the
technical requirements for preparation and authentication of
the certification order.
F. Section 6: Discretion to Accept or Decline Certification
This section makes it clear that the supreme court need
never accept any certified question unless it wishes to do so.
It further suggests factors which may (but need not) influence
the court's decision. The list of factors, which is of course not
exclusive, is adapted from Western Helicopter Services, Inc. v.
Rogerson Aircraft Corp.'o'
The court's absolute discretion in this area is necessary
for docket control and to avoid ceding any sovereign power to
another entity. Because the supreme court's discretion is ab-
solute, it need never justify its decision to decline to answer
or force its decision within any technical exception to the Pro-
posed Rule. This section alone would be sufficient authority
for declining. But, if the court should decline a question, an
opinion or memorandum stating its reasons for doing so
would be useful in guiding the practice of future certifying
courts, and it would help confine future certifications to ques-
tions the court is likely to accept. 102
G. Section 7
1. Discretion to Restate
This provision, added by courts in some states, is a very
useful feature. By explicitly reserving to the court the right
to restate the question as it deems proper, it ensures the
court maximum flexibility in fashioning its response. 10 3 The
Ninth Circuit has expressly recognized this discretion.
10 4
2. Questions of California Law
It seems self-evident that a question of federal law
should not be certified to a state court, and federal appellate
101. 811 P.2d 627 (Or. 1991).
102. See, e.g., Griffith v. United States, 858 F. Supp. 278, 283 (D. Mass. 1994)
(declining to certify a question based on the standards the state's highest court
had expressed in its published opinions).
103. See, e.g., Kincaid v. Mangum, 432 S.E.2d 74, 82-83 (W. Va. 1993).




courts are usually vigilant to avoid this. 0 5 There are, how-
ever, some reported cases where a federal court has asked a
state court whether a state statute can be read to avoid re-
pugnance to the federal constitution, or made some other in-
quiry about federal law. 10 6 This provision is included to dis-
courage such abuses.
H. Section 8
1. Practice Under the Rule
Many of these provisions are adapted from the Uniform
Act or from the rules of various states. Most states' versions
of certification rules either provide only for splitting fees and
costs evenly, or permit variance at the option of the certifying
court. This Proposed Rule extends the option to vary to the
supreme court as well.
2. Briefing and Argument
Some states are quite specific about briefing schedules,
size of briefs, number of copies, and other technical details.
These issues seem better treated by reference to the ordinary
rules of court for California and particular problems can be
addressed if they arise. The Judicial Council is specifically
included, pursuant to California practice.
3. Petitioner
Advance specification of who is the moving party, an at-
tractive feature of some states' rules (e.g., Maine, Mississippi,
Oregon), is adopted here to anticipate a potential procedural
problem. The style "Petitioner" is chosen as less confusing
than "Appellant," following Oregon practice.
4. Priority
Some states give priority to certified questions. While
this may be desirable (as certification involves delays for the
litigants and for the certifying court), it involves correspond-
ing delays for other supreme court litigants. This decision is
best made on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, the Proposed
105. See, e.g., Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853, 857 (10th Cir. 1975) (dis-
approving district court certification of question whether disposition of property
following divorce was a "taxable event").
106. See, e.g., A.K.H. v. R.C.T., 822 P.2d 135 (Or. 1991); Abrams v. West Va.
Racing Comm'n, 263 S.E.2d 103 (W. Va. 1980).
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Rule gives the Court the option to grant priority without re-
quiring it to do so.
I. Section 9: Intervention by Attorney General
Although this is not part of the Uniform Act, some states
(e.g., Maine, Louisiana) have such a provision in their rules.
This rule gives the court the option to offer intervention with-
out requiring that it do so.
J. Section 10: Transmission of Answer
Like section 5, this section is technical in nature, and
sets out the procedure for transmitting the answer to a certi-
fied question.
K. Section 11: Reference
Obviously, certification is useless unless the end product
is an opinion of the receiving state's highest court. 10 7 This
section is included to take account of earlier proposals and
concerns of the state bar. To make it explicit that even if the
supreme court, having received a certified question, should
make a reference to a lower court, its end product would still
be a holding by the supreme court. Reference could of course
be made without the authority of this section. The provision
in section 10, requiring transmission of the "written opinion
of the California Supreme Court," would in any case itself re-
quire that the end product be the opinion of the supreme
court.
The purpose of this section is to provide assurance that
reference, if used, would not be abused, and that any an-
swered question would have the authority of the supreme
court. Reference would be of little value anyway, as there
would be no need for fact-finding (if the factual record were
not already adequate, the question would not ordinarily be
accepted108), and the legal determination would have to be
reviewed by the supreme court in any event.
107. "Certification would be a pointless exercise unless the state court's an-
swers are regarded as an authoritative and binding statement of state law."
WRIGHT ET. AL, supra note 37, § 4248.
108. See, e.g., Eley v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 500 N.W.2d 61, 64 (Iowa 1993)




1. Authority and Force
This is an essential element of any certification
procedure.
2. Judicata
This provision, found in the laws of some states (e.g.,
Alaska, Minnesota) specifies that the answer binds the par-
ties in their specific dispute, and helps prevent the answer
from being considered an advisory opinion.
M. Section 13: Judicial Council
This provides for Judicial Council participation in future
rulemaking.
N. Omitted Sections
1. Power to Certify
Unlike the versions adopted in most states, this Proposed
Rule does not contain a provision for certifying questions
from California to another state. The "State Courts" com-
mentary to section 1, dealing with certification from other
states' courts, applies here as well. 10 9
2. Severability
A severability clause is contained in the Uniform Act and
in most state statutes, providing that if a given section should
be found unconstitutional the remainder of the law would
survive as much as possible. As this certification procedure is
designed to be adopted by Supreme Court Rule, a severability
provision does not appear to be required. Such a clause
should be added to the text in the event a certification proce-
dure should be adopted by statute.
3. Uniformity
As this Proposed Rule is not intended as a statute, and
differs in many important respects from the Uniform Act, the
Act's provision that it should be interpreted so as to effectu-
ate the purpose of uniformity among the states has little ap-
plication. As with severability, a suitable uniformity clause
109. See discussion supra part VI.A.2.
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should be added in the event the legislature adopts the Uni-
form Act or a variation of it.
VII. CONCLUSION
A certification procedure is long overdue. In a state
whose law is relevant to cases and transactions all over the
country, it is absurd that federal courts should have to guess
California law when a tested procedure exists for our own
supreme court to state it authoritatively. Such a procedure,
ideally following the text of the above proposal, should be
adopted as a rule without delay by either the California
Supreme Court or the Judicial Council. Failing that, the leg-
islature should either amend the California Government
Code and direct the supreme court to adopt a certification
rule or adopt a certification procedure by statute (ideally
based on this proposal and denominated to take its place
within the Uniform Act).
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APPENDIX I: VOLUME OF CERTIFIED QUESTIONS
The following table shows certifications to state supreme
courts in the Ninth Circuit for the years 1990 and 1991, as a
proportion of the total filing on those courts. The figures are
not entirely comparable - the certification figures contain
approximations, and the figures for total filings reflect differ-
ing compilation methods. Nevertheless, they are sufficient to
provide a general view of the volumes in Ninth Circuit states.
Total Certifications as
State/Year Certifications Filings % of Total Filings
Alaska 1990 3 578 0.0051
Alaska 1991 3 612 0.0049
Arizona 1990 3 1194 0.0025
Arizona 1991 3 1179 0.0025
Hawaii 1990 4 624 0.0064
Hawaii 1991 4 755 0.0052
Idaho 1990 0 541 0
Idaho 1991 0 570 0
Montana 1990 3 633 0.0047
Montana 1991 2 636 0.0031
Nevada 1990 3 1089 0.0027
Nevada 1991 3 1048 0.0028
Oregon 1990 2 971 0.0020
Oregon 1991 2 1035 0.0019
Washington 1990 0 1039 0
Washington 1991 2 1026 0.0019
The average percentage, excluding years with no certifi-
cations, was 0.0035; the average including years with no cer-
tifications was 0.0028. Thus, a third of a percent is a good
figure for rough reckoning.
In 1990, there were 3409 filings in the California
Supreme Court, and in 1991 there were 3505. Applying the
average figure of a third of a percent to these totals yields an
extrapolated figure of eleven to twelve certifications a year.
The true figure would probably be lower (especially as district
courts would not be able to certify under the Proposed Rule),
and of course all certified questions need not be accepted.
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APPENDIX II: COMPARISON OF CALIFORNIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS WITH THOSE OF OTHER STATES
Summary
A number of state supreme courts have ruled that ac-
cepting certified questions, or prescribing a certification pro-
cedure by supreme court rule, did not offend their state con-
stitutions. The material in this appendix examines the state
constitutional context for those decisions. It shows the domi-
nant majority rule among the states to be that a judiciary ar-
ticle, specifying the jurisdiction and powers of the state
supreme court in enumerative fashion without specifically re-
stricting the power to accept and decide certified questions,
does not limit the power of the court to adopt a certification
provision by rule or to answer certified questions under a pro-
cedure adopted by statute.
California
The arguably relevant portions of the California Consti-
tution are Article VI, sections 10 through 12. They read in
pertinent part as follows:
Section 10. The Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior
courts, and their judges have original jurisdiction in
habeas corpus proceedings. Those courts also have origi-
nal jurisdiction in proceedings for extraordinary relief in
the nature of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition.
Superior Courts have original jurisdiction in all causes ex-
cept those given by statute to other trial courts.
Section 11. The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction
when judgment of death has been pronounced. With that
exception courts of appeal have appellate jurisdiction
when superior courts have original jurisdiction and in
other causes prescribed by statute.
Section 12. (a) The Supreme Court may, before decision,
transfer to itself a cause in a court of appeal. It may,
before decision, transfer a cause from itself to a court of




(b) The Supreme Court may review the decision of a court
of appeal in any cause.11 °
These provisions are relevant only on the theory that the
power to accept and decide certified questions is ultra vires
unless explicitly provided for in the state constitution. The
prevailing constitutional theory does not require a specific
grant of jurisdiction, but relies instead on the inherent power
of the judicial department to implement its portion of the sov-
ereign powers of the state. One of these powers is to declare
the law of the state when requested by another sovereign.
Article IV, section 1 (analogous to similar provisions in virtu-
ally every state constitution) states that:
The judicial power of this State is vested in the Supreme
Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, municipal courts,
and justice courts. All courts are courts of record.'11
It follows from this that, as answering certified questions
is an exercise of the judicial power of the state, it must be
vested in one or more of these courts. 1 12 Because of the na-
ture of certification, this can only mean the supreme court.
Note also that Article VI, section 6, establishing the Judi-
cial Council, provides that:
To improve the administration of justice the council shall
survey judicial business and make recommendations to
the courts, make recommendations annually to the Gover-
nor and Legislature, adopt rules for court administration,
practice and procedure, not inconsistent with statute, and
perform other functions prescribed by statute." 3
Because answering certified questions is part of the judi-
cial power of the state, this section empowers the judicial
council to adopt a rule of practice and procedure for that pur-
pose provided the rule is not inconsistent with statute."
4
110. CAL. CONST. art VI, §§ 10-12.
111. Id. § 1.
112. See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 520
P.2d 29, 39 (Cal. 1974) (indicating that Article VI disposes of all judicial power
not expressly disposed of elsewhere in state constitution, leaving entire judicial
power concentrated in state court system and constitutional agencies).
113. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
114. It is doubtful, given this theory of constitutionality, whether the legisla-
ture could lawfully restrict the power of the supreme court or the Judicial Coun-
cil to answer certified questions. But, as it has made no such attempt to do so,
the issue has not arisen.
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The constitutionality of a certification procedure,
adopted either by rule or by statute, is discussed more fully in
the text of this article.' 15
Ohio
Ohio adopted a certification procedure in 1988 by
Supreme Court Rule.' 16 In the leading case of Scott v. Bank
One Trust Co.,"' the Ohio Supreme Court considered
whether the rule "is consistent with the Ohio Constitution[,
with] focus on whether we have jurisdiction under Section 2,
Article IV of the Constitution to answer certified ques-
tions.""" The pertinent portion of that section is subsection
(B), which read at the time as follows:
(B)(1) The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction
in the following: (a) Quo warranto; (b) Mandamus; (c)
Habeas corpus; (d) Prohibition; (e) Procedendo; (f) In any
cause on review as may be necessary to its complete deter-
mination; (g) Admission to the practice of law, the disci-
pline of persons so admitted, and all other matters relat-
ing to the practice of law.
(2) The supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction as
follows: (a) In appeals from the courts of appeal as a mat-
ter of right in the following: (i) Cases originating in the
courts of appeals; (ii) Cases in which the death penalty
has been affirmed; (iii) Cases involving questions arising
under the constitution of the United States or of this
state. (b) In appeals from the courts of appeals in cases of
felony on leave first obtained. (c) Such revisory jurisdic-
tion of the proceedings of administrative officers or agen-
cies as may be conferred by law. (d) in cases of public or
great general interest, the supreme court may direct any
court of appeals to certify its record to the supreme court,
and may review and affirm, modify, or reverse the judg-
ment of the court of appeals. (e) The supreme court shall
review and affirm, modify, or reverse the judgment in any
case certified by any court of appeals pursuant to section
3(B)(4) 119 of this article.
115. See discussion supra part IV.
116. OHIO R. PRAc. S. CT. XVI, superseded by, OHIO R. PRAc. S. CT. XVIII,
§§ 1-8.
117. 577 N.E.2d 1077 (Ohio 1991).
118. Scott, 577 N.E.2d at 1079.
119. This reference is obscure since the present section 3 has no such subsec-
tion. See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(3).
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(3) No law shall be passed or rule made whereby any per-
son shall be prevented from invoking the original jurisdic-
tion of the supreme court.
120
Because this constitutional passage contains many very
precise specifications of jurisdiction, it is susceptible to the
interpretation that the court's only powers are those that are
enumerated. It is even more precise in this regard than the
California Constitution. Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme
Court took the position that "jurisdictional analysis is irrele-
vant" to the rule's constitutionality. 12 1 The Ohio Court put it
this way:
In our view, [the] power [to decide certified questions] ex-
ists by virtue of Ohio's very existence as a state in our
federal system. We begin with a truism: the Ohio Consti-
tution permits the state to exercise its own sovereignty as
far as the United States Constitution and laws permit.
Since federal law recognizes Ohio's sovereignty by making
Ohio law applicable in federal courts, the state has the
power to exercise and the responsibility to protect that
sovereignty. Therefore, if answering certified questions
serves to further the state's interests and preserve the
state's sovereignty, the appropriate branch of state gov-




Article VII, section 4 of the Oklahoma Constitution speci-
fies the jurisdiction of the supreme court in the enumerated
format.
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall be
coextensive with the State and shall extend to all cases at
law and in equity; except that the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction in crimi-
nal cases until otherwise provided by statute and in the
event there is any conflict as to jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court shall determine which court has jurisdiction and
such determination shall be final. The original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court shall extend to a general super-
intending control over all inferior courts and all Agencies,
Commissions and Boards created by law. The Supreme
120. Id. § 2(B).
121. Scott, 577 N.E.2d at 1079.
122. Id. at 1079-80.
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Court, Court of Criminal Appeals, in criminal matters and
all other appellate courts shall have power to issue, hear
and determine writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo
warranto, certiorari, prohibition and such other remedial
writs as may be provided by law and may exercise such
other and further jurisdiction as may be conferred by stat-
ute. ... The appellate and the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and all other appellate courts shall be in-
voked in the manner provided by law. 123
As to whether this limited the capacity of the Oklahoma
Supreme Court to answer certified questions, the court took
the same position as the Ohio Supreme Court.
This court needs no explicit grant of jurisdiction to answer
certified questions from a federal court; such power comes
from the United States Constitution's grant of state sover-
eignty. By answering a state-law question certified by a
federal court, we may affect the outcome of federal litiga-
tion, but it is the federal court who hears and decides the
cause. "Except in matters governed by the Federal Con-
stitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in
any case is the law of the state." Certification assures
that the federal courts are apprised of the substantive
norms of the Oklahoma legal system.1 24
Florida
Florida adopted a certification procedure by statute in
1945, and the supreme court promulgated a rule implement-
ing the procedure. 125 In 1956, the Florida Constitution was
revised, and the jurisdiction of the supreme court was set out
in the familiar enumerated variety. 126 The 1956 constitu-
tional provision read in pertinent part as follows:
2. Jurisdiction.... The supreme court may issue writs
of mandamus and quo warranto when a State officer,
board, commission, or other agency authorized to repre-
sent the public generally, or a member of any such board,
commission, or other agency, is named as respondent, and
writs of prohibition to commissions established by law, to
the district courts of appeal, and to the trial courts when
123. OKLA. CONST. art VII, § 4.
124. Bonner v. Oklahoma Rock Corp., 863 P.2d 1176, 1179 n.3 (Okla. 1993)
(citations omitted).
125. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West 1988); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.150.
126. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4.
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questions are involved upon which a direct appeal to the
supreme court is allowed as a matter of right. The
supreme court may issue all writs necessary or proper to
the complete exercise of its jurisdiction. 127
In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Clay,128 the Florida
Supreme Court considered whether that section, "which de-
lineates the appellate jurisdiction of this court and provides
for the issuance by it of named writs, should be construed as
prohibiting this court from exercising any judicial powers
other than those expressly provided for therein. "129
The court concluded that the enumeration did not re-
strict the court's power to accept certified questions. The
court further held there was
a fundamental principle of constitutional law that each
department of government ... has, without any express
grant, the inherent right to accomplish all objects natu-
rally within the orbit of that department, not expressly
limited by the fact of the existence of a similar power else-
where or the express limitations in the constitution.
We have concluded that, in the absence of a constitutional
provision expressly or by necessary implication limiting
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to those matters ex-
pressly conferred upon it, and in the absence of a constitu-
tional provision expressly conferring upon another court
jurisdiction to exercise the judicial power which is the
subject matter of § 25.031 and Rule 4.61, and in the light
of the well-settled rule that all sovereign power, including
the judicial power, "not limited by a state constitution in-
heres to the people of [the] state," such power may be
granted to this court by statute if it is deemed to be a sub-
stantive matter, or by rule of this court if it is deemed to
be a matter of "practice and procedure."
30
127. Id. Although this provision has been superseded by two later constitu-
tional revisions, the text as it stood in 1961 is the relevant one for understand-
ing the Florida court's constitutional holding. The current Florida Constitution
expressly provides for the supreme court to accept certified questions. Id.
§ 3(b)(6).
128. 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961).
129. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 133 So. 2d at 741.
130. Id. at 742-43. The court specifically distinguished City of Dunedin v.
Bense, 90 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1956). In that case, the court held unconstitutional a
legislative attempt to grant the court original jurisdiction to issue a writ of in-
junction, when the then constitutional provision granted a lower court "exclu-
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Washington
The Washington legislature enacted a certification proce-
dure in 1965.' 3 1 In In re Elliott, 32 the Washington Supreme
Court was asked to decide whether "the enactment of RCW
2.60 was not within the power of the state legislature because
it requires of the court a function which it cannot constitu-
tionally perform" under Article IV, section 4 of the Washing-
ton Constitution.133 That section read in pertinent part as
follows:
The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in
habeas corpus, and quo warranto and mandamus as to all
state officers, and appellate jurisdiction in all actions and
proceedings, excepting that its appellate jurisdiction shall
not extend to civil actions at law for the recovery of money
or personal property when the original amount in contro-
versy, or the value of the property does not exceed the
sum of two hundred dollars ($200) unless the action in-
volves the legality of a tax, impost, assessment, toll, mu-
nicipal fine, or the validity of a statute. The supreme
court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus,
review, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari and all other
writs necessary to the complete exercise of its appellate
and revisory jurisdiction. 134
The Washington Supreme Court noted the similarity of
its constitutional provision to that of Florida. Relying on the
reasoning of the Florida court in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Clay,' 35 the court held the certification statute constitu-
tional.13 6 The court went on to hold that its right to accept a
certified question was inherent.
So patent is the power of a court to render an opinion in
response to a certified question that New Hampshire has
adopted the practice by court rule, not waiting for an ex-
pression of legislative approval of the idea. Supreme
Court Rule 21... is treated by the New Hampshire court
sive original jurisdiction in all cases in equity." City of Dunedin, 90 So. 2d at
302 (quoting Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 741 (Fla. 1961)).
131. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.60 (West 1988).
132. 446 P.2d 347 (Wash. 1968).
133. In re Elliott, 446 P.2d at 350.
134. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
135. 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961). See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying
text.
136. In re Elliott, 446 P.2d at 358.
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as a rule of procedure, that court obviously finding no con-
stitutional impediment to the adoption of such a rule.
This court, under its rule-making power.., could do
as the Supreme Court of New Hampshire has done. It
could also accept a certified question and respond to it
even if there were no implementing statute or rule. It is
within the inherent power of the court as the judicial body
authorized by the constitution to render decisions respect-
ing the law of this state. 137
Idaho
The Idaho Constitution's treatment of the supreme
court's jurisdiction also follows the traditional enumerated
pattern. Article V, section 9, reads as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review,
upon appeal, any decision of the district courts, or the
judges thereof, and any order of the public utilities com-
mission, and any order of the industrial accident board:
the legislature may provide conditions of appeal, scope of
appeal, and procedure on appeal from orders of the public
utilities commission and of the industrial accident board.
On appeal from orders of the industrial accident board the
court shall be limited to a review of questions of law. The
Supreme Court shall also have original jurisdiction to is-
sue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and
habeas corpus, and all writs necessary or proper to the
complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. 138
Nevertheless, the Idaho Supreme Court followed the
Washington and Florida precedents in Sunshine Mining Co.
v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co.,139 and held that it had the
power to entertain certified questions "by exercise of its judi-
137. Id. The New Hampshire Constitution apparently does not now have an
enumerated article specifying the jurisdiction of the supreme court, but only a
general article stating that "[tihe judicial power of the state shall be vested in
the supreme court, a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the superior
court, and such lower courts as the legislature may establish. ... " N.H. CONST.
pt. 2, art. 72-a. See also id. art. 73-a (permitting the supreme court to establish
rules of practice and procedure which was added in 1978 after the Washington
court's decision in Elliott).
138. IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 9. Furthermore, Article V, § 10 provides that
"t]he Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear claims against the
state, but its decision shall be merely recommendatory; no process in the nature
of execution shall issue thereon; they shall be reported to the next session of the
legislature for its action." Id. § 10.
139. 666 P.2d 1144 (Idaho 1983).
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cial power." 4 ° The Idaho court held explicitly that doing so
was within its inherent power to make the judicial power ef-
fective in the administration of justice.' 4 '
Maine
Like Washington and Idaho, Maine also followed Florida
precedent in holding a certification statute'4 2 constitutional.
Unlike those states, however, the Maine constitution con-
tains no specific enumeration of powers for the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court, providing only (as do virtually all state constitu-
tions) that the judicial power of the state is vested in that
court and in inferior courts.' 4 3 In In re Richards,' the court
held as follows:
In holding that it had constitutional sanction to partici-
pate in the certification procedure, [the Florida Supreme
Court] rested its position squarely upon the concept of the
reservoir of power of the people of a state .... We con-
clude as did the Florida court that our participation in the
certification procedure will constitute a valid exercise of
our "judicial power."' 4 '
Montana
Like those of New Hampshire and Maine, the Montana
Constitution does not have an enumerated listing of the pow-
ers of the state supreme court, but only a standard general
article vesting the judicial power in that court and inferior
courts. When the court accepted a certified question, and the
constitutionality of its doing so was questioned, the court re-
sponded very summarily. "Glens Falls now argues that this
Court, under [Supreme Court] Rule 1, lacks authority to en-
tertain such a certification.... We shall merely say that we
do have such authority and that this is a proper case to exer-
cise the authority." 4 '
140. Sunshine Mining Co., 666 P.2d at 1147 (citing In re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347(Wash. 1968) and Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961)).
141. Id. at 1147-48.
142. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 57 (West 1965).
143. See ME. CONST. art VI, § 1.
144. 223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966).
145. In re Richards, 223 A.2d at 832.
146. Irion v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 461 P.2d 199, 203 (Mont. 1969). The rule
referred to as "Supreme Court Rule 1" (actually Montana Rules of Appellate




Article VI of the New Mexico Constitution provides for
supreme court jurisdiction in the enumerated format.
Sec. 2. Appeals from a judgment of the district court im-
posing a sentence of death or life imprisonment shall be
taken directly to the supreme court. In all other cases,
criminal and civil, the supreme court shall exercise appel-
late jurisdiction as may be provided by law; provided that
an aggrieved party shall have an absolute right to one
appeal.
Sec. 3. The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction
in quo warranto and mandamus against all state officers,
boards and commissions, and shall have a superintending
control over all inferior courts; it shall also have power to
issue writs of mandamus, error, prohibition, habeas
corpus, certiorari, injunction and all other writs necessary
or proper for the complete exercise of its jurisdiction and
to hear and determine the same. Such writs may be is-
sued by direction of the court, or by any justice thereof.
Each justice shall have power to issue writs of habeas
corpus upon petition by or on behalf of a person held in
actual custody, and to make such writs returnable before
himself or before the supreme court, or before any of the
district courts or any judge thereof.147
The New Mexico Supreme Court has not found this an
impediment to accepting certified questions. In Schlieter v.
Carlos,4 s the leading state case on the question, the court
assumed the basic constitutionality of the procedure and con-
sidered only whether the question met the procedural re-
quirement 149 that the answer be "determinative" of the
cause. 150 Although it did not accept the question, the opinion
leaves little doubt that they would have accepted a question
presented in the appropriate posture.
151
order an appeal may be taken" to the Montana Supreme Court, and makes no
mention of certified questions. The rule was amended in 1986, after the Irion
decision, and is now called Montana Rules of Appellate Civil Procedure Rule 1.
See MoNT. R. App. Civ. P. 1. There is no reason to think the amendment af-
fected the constitutionality of certification.
147. N.M. CONST. art VI, §§ 2-3.
148. 775 P.2d 709 (N.M. 1989).
149. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-8(A) (Michie Supp. 1995); N.M. S. CT. R.
App. P. 12-607(A).
150. Schlieter, 775 P.2d at 710.
151. The New Mexico Supreme Court has since accepted many certified
questions. See, e.g., Archibeque v. Moya, 866 P.2d 344 (N.M. 1993).
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Utah
The only reported case holding it unconstitutional to
adopt a certification procedure is Holden v. N.L. Industries,
Inc. 5 2 This case turned on specific exclusionary language in
the Utah Constitution. At the time of the decision, the Utah
Constitution read as follows: "The Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari,
prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus.... In other
cases the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction
only, and power to issue writs necessary and proper for the
exercise of that jurisdiction."'53
The Utah court held that the word "only" prevented the
supreme court from exercising jurisdiction over certified
questions.
The Wyoming Supreme Court also rejected a certified question as prema-
ture without suggesting that the constitution prohibited accepting it in an ap-
propriate posture. See In re Certified Question, 549 P.2d 1310 (Wyo. 1976).
Wyoming has since entertained certified questions without any suggestion that
the procedure is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Co. v. Columbia Casu-
alty Co., 682 P.2d 975 (Wyo. 1984). Article V, § 3 of the Wyoming constitution
is an enumerative provision, reading in pertinent part as follows:
The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in quo warranto and
mandamus as to all state officers, and in habeas corpus. The supreme
court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, review, prohi-
bition, habeas corpus, certiorari, and other writs necessary and proper
to the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction.
WYO. CONST. art. V, § 3.
The Oregon Supreme Court has likewise entertained certified questions
without the constitutionality of its doing so having been questioned. See, e.g.,
Western Helicopter Servs., Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 811 P.2d 627 (Or.
1991) (enumerating factors to guide the discretion of a state supreme court in
considering whether to accept a certified question). The Oregon constitutional
provision is not enumerative. See OR. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
The Georgia Constitution now specifically provides for acceptance of certi-
fied questions. See GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, 4. But, even before this provision
was in effect, the Georgia Supreme Court "impliedly concluded" without consti-
tutional analysis that it had such jurisdiction "by adopting appropriate rules"
and by its prior acceptance of a certified question. Miree v. United States, 249
S.E.2d 573, 577 (Ga. 1978). See also McClintock v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 241 S.E.2d 831, 832 (Ga. 1978).
152. 629 P.2d 428, 432 (Utah 1981).
153. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (amended 1984) (emphasis added). The
omitted portion dealt with procedural aspects of habeas corpus. The Utah Con-
stitution has since been amended (presumably in response to the Holden case),
and now explicitly authorizes the supreme court to accept certified questions
from federal courts. See id. § 3; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2 (Michie Supp. 1995);
UTAH R. App. P. 41.
CERTIFICATION RULE
The comparable provision in most state constitutions
omits the word only. In the absence of that negative, the
constitutional conferral of appellate jurisdiction would be
susceptible to the construction that the court's jurisdiction
could be enlarged by an exercise of legislative or judicial
power. Such was the case in In re Elliott... where the
Washington Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of a statute providing for certification.1 54
The absence of any such restriction in the California
Constitution strongly suggests that the power of the Califor-
nia Supreme Court is not inhibited in this regard. 5 '
Missouri
Missouri follows the extremely restrictive theory that
any power not specifically mentioned is withheld. Its
supreme court has held, in a series of unreported memo-
randa, that the jurisdiction provided for it under its state cer-
tification statute was beyond that permitted by its state con-
stitution. 15 6  The relevant portion of the Missouri
Constitution reads as follows:
Section 1. The judicial power of the state shall be vested
in a supreme court, a court of appeals consisting of dis-
tricts as prescribed by law, and circuit courts.
Section 2. The supreme court shall be the highest court in
the state. Its jurisdiction shall be coextensive with the
state. Its decisions shall be controlling in all other courts.
Section 3. The supreme court shall have exclusive appel-
late jurisdiction in all cases involving the validity of a
treaty or statute of the United States, or of a statute or
provision of the constitution of this state, the construction
of the revenue laws of this state, the title to any state of-
154. Holden, 629 P.2d at 430 (emphasis added).
155. The Idaho Supreme Court made this point specifically in relation to its
own similar statute in Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 666 P.2d
1144 (Idaho 1983).
Such a limitation is absent from article 5, section 9 of the Idaho
Constitution. Thus, the Holden rationale does not persuade us that
I.A.R. 12.1 [the certification rule] is unconstitutional. We may there-
fore construe our constitution in a manner similar to the construction
placed by the Washington Supreme Court upon their constitution.
Id. at 1147 (citation omitted).
156. See, e.g., Grantham v. Missouri Dep't of Corrections, No. 72576, 1990
WL 602159 (Mo. 1990).
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fice and in all cases where the punishment imposed is
death. The court of appeals shall have general appellate
jurisdiction in all cases except those within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the supreme court.
Section 4. The supreme court shall have general superin-
tending control over all courts and tribunals. Each dis-
trict of the court of appeals shall have general superin-
tending control over all courts and tribunals in its
jurisdiction. The supreme court and districts of the court
of appeals may issue and determine original remedial
writs. Supervisory authority over all courts is vested in
the supreme court which may make appropriate delega-
tions of this power.
Section 5. The supreme court may establish rules relating
to practice, procedure and pleading for all courts and ad-
ministrative tribunals, which shall have the force and ef-
fect of law. The rules shall not change substantive rights
.... Any rule may be annulled or amended in whole or in
part by a law limited to the purpose. 157
There is nothing in this constitutional language which
either restricts or enables the Missouri Supreme Court with
regard to certified questions. The Missouri Supreme Court
appears to have an extremely narrow view of its powers and
not to have taken into account the inherent powers implied
by Article 1. California need not accept this approach, but
remains free to adopt the more expansive majority view, ar-
ticulated most clearly by Ohio and Washington.
Other States
A number of other states have adopted certification pro-
cedures by rule or statute, but the constitutionality of their
doing so has not been questioned in any reported case. The
constitutions of some of these states enumerate powers of
their supreme courts;15 s others merely have a general section
vesting judicial power.159 At least one appears on its face to
restrict the supreme court to strictly appellate jurisdiction. 160
In the absence of judicial interpretation, these procedures
157. Mo. CONST. art. V, §§ 1-5.
158. See, e.g., Wvo. CoNsT. art. V, § 2.
159. See, e.g., N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
160. See Ky. CONST. § 110(2)(a), which provides: "The Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction only, except it shall have the power to issue all writs
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must be presumed constitutional in accordance with the ma-
jority rule. The rule, that answering questions of state law
certified by a federal court is an expression of state sover-
eignty and an inherent power of the judicial department of
the state, leaves the constitutionality of a certification proce-
dure unaffected by any constitutional language short of a spe-
cific prohibition.
necessary in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or the complete determination of
any cause, or as may be required to exercise control of the Court of Justice." Id.
This provision has not inhibited the Kentucky Supreme Court from ac-
cepting certified questions. See, e.g., Goodin v. Overnight Trans. Co., 701
S.W.2d 131 (Ky. 1985); Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.37.
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